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Abstract
Background: The home-management of malaria strategy seeks to improve prompt and effective anti-malarial
drug use through the informal sector, with a potential channel being the Private Medicine Retailers (PMRs).
Previous evaluations of PMR programmes focused on their impact on retailer knowledge and practices, with
limited evidence about the influence of implementation processes on the impacts at scale. This paper examines
how the implementation processes of three PMR programmes in Kenya, each scaled up within a district,
contributed to the outcomes observed. These were a Ministry of Health programme in Kwale district; and two
programmes supported by non-governmental organizations in collaboration with government in Kisii Central
and Bungoma districts.
Methods: The research methods included 24 focus group discussions with clients and PMRs, 19 in-depth
interviews with implementing actors, document review and a diary of events. The data were analysed using the
combination of a broad policy analysis framework and more specific scaling up/diffusion of innovations
frameworks.
Results: The Kisii programme, a case study of successful implementation, was underpinned by good relationships
between district health managers and a “resource team”, supported by a memorandum of understanding which
enabled successful implementation. It had flexible budgetary and decision making processes which were
responsive to local contexts, and took account of local socio-economic activities. In contrast, the Kwale
programme, which had implementation challenges, was characterised by a complex funding process, with lengthy
timelines, that was tied to the government financial management system which constrained implementation
Although there was a flexible funding system in Bungoma, a perceived lack of transparency in fund management,
inadequate management of inter-organisational relationships, and inability to adapt and respond to changing
circumstances led to implementation difficulties.
Conclusions: For effective scaling up of PMR programmes, the provision of technical support and adequate
resources are vital, but not sufficient on their own. An active strategy to manage relationships between
implementing actors through effective communication mechanisms is essential. Successful outcomes may be
realised if a strong and transparent management system, including management of financial resources, is put in
place. This study provides evidence of the value of assessing implementation processes as part of impact
evaluation for public health programmes.
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Background
Prompt treatment with effective anti-malarial therapy
remains the cornerstone of malaria control in sub-
Saharan Africa [1,2]. The home-management of malaria
(HMM) strategy aims to improve prompt and effective
anti-malarial drug use outside the formal health system
[3], with a potential channel being the Private Medicine
Retailers (PMRs) [4-6].
Interventions to promote early treatment of childhood
fevers through PMRs have been tested in small scale
settings [6] with a recent assessment in Kenya of the
impact of PMR interventions at scale [7]. All these eva-
luations show that PMR interventions led to improved
knowledge and practices of PMRs, and a high rate of
appropriate treatment of malaria and other childhood
illnesses among communities. However, past evaluations
of PMR training programmes have focussed only on
impacts on retailer knowledge and practices, providing
limited evidence about how these impacts are influenced
by implementation processes [6]. This paper, therefore,
seeks to address this knowledge gap, drawing on the
qualitative component of a larger study that assessed the
performance of three different PMR programmes in
Kenya, all of which involved efforts to scale up PMR
training from small-scale pilot activities to district-wide
implementation.
The three programmes were implemented by the
Ministry of Health (MoH) in Kwale district; by a colla-
boration of government health officials and a non-
governmental organization (NGO), Merlin, in Kisii
Central district; and by a collaboration of government
health officials and NGO, African Medical Research
Foundation (AMREF), with support from the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID)
in Bungoma district. Full implementation began in 2005
and 2006 in Kwale and Kisii, respectively; but the Bun-
goma district programme has a history dating back to
1998, with a new phase of intervention activities imple-
mented in 2005 after the withdrawal of the first line
drug, Sulphadoxine pyrimethamine (SP). The current
evaluation was conducted six months after the imple-
mentation of the programmes in each site.
The quantitative outcomes of these three programmes
were assessed through a quasi-experimental design,
involving comparisons between intervention and control
areas, matched on the basis of similarity in geographical
features, and malariometric indices. The primary indica-
tor for the quantitative assessment was change in PMR
knowledge and practice, following training on the use of
amodiaquine as the drug of choice in the retail sector.
As reported in detail elsewhere [8], positive effects were
found in two sites. In Kisii, 60.5% of trained PMRs sold
amodiaquine medicines in adequate doses compared to
2.8% in the untrained ones (OR; 53.5: 95% CI 6.7,
428.3). There was evidence of a lower impact in Kwale,
where 18.8% of trained PMRs sold amodiaquine medi-
cines adequately compared to 2.3% of control PMRs
(OR; 9.4: 95% CI 1.1, 83.7). The study was unable to
show evidence of impact in Bungoma as the scaling up
process in this district prevented identification of suita-
ble control areas. However, previous assessments had
indicated broader impacts, where the intervention seems
to have had a significant impact on stocking patterns,
malaria knowledge and prescribing practices of shops/
kiosks [9].
This paper compares implementation experiences
across all three sites, considering what factors are likely
to have contributed to differences in programme experi-
ences, including the outcome differences between Kisii
and Kwale districts.
Methods
The study reported here was a retrospective policy ana-
lysis that investigated the three programmes’ implemen-
tation process. This involved data collection, both at
district level and in the sub-district programme inter-
vention areas. In Kwale, this included two out of the six
divisions of the district; in Kisii, one out of eight divi-
sions; and, in Bungoma, one out of ten divisions. Divi-
sions are the third administrative tier in Kenya and have
an average population of about 70,000 people.
Kisii Central is located in Western Kenya with a high-
land/epidemic type of malaria transmission. The district,
which relies on agricultural activities, has a population
of 491 786 people served by 140 health facilities. Bun-
goma is also situated in Western Kenya and predomi-
nantly agricultural, but with an endemic malaria profile.
It has a population of 876 491, served by 61 health facil-
ities. Kwale district is on the Kenyan Coast with an
endemic malaria transmission pattern [10] and a popu-
lation of 496 133, served by 109 health facilities. The
district relies on tourism and fishing as the main eco-
nomic activity.
Data collection methods
To understand the policy and programme context, the
Principal investigator (TA, first author) reviewed docu-
ments such as reports, work plans, minutes of meetings,
memos, financial returns and programme materials.
A document review template was used to collect
relevant information on the content of the intervention,
policy environment, actors involved and the implementa-
tion processes. These data were used to develop tools at
the initial stages and to validate data from interview
materials as part of triangulation. The process also helped
to construct a time line of the implementation process.
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Respondents for focus group discussions (FGDs) were
selected purposively from the programme sites. For the
client FGDs (n=12, four per district), the criterion for
selection was mothers with children under five from the
programme areas. For the retailer FGDs (n =12, four
per district), the criteria were that the PMR was trained
and was still operating a retail outlet within the pro-
gramme area. All FGD respondents were recruited by
local administrative leaders in each site, with the help of
program officers. TA and two research assistants con-
ducted all the FGDs. The number of participants varied
in each group across the districts, averaging between 8-
12 persons per session. All discussions were conducted
in convenient venues for the participants. An attempt to
capture group interaction was made through recording
non-verbal expressions. All the interviews were recorded
within the boundaries of confidentiality agreed at the
time of discussions, and supplemented with written
notes. All discussions were conducted in languages
understandable to the participants, and focussed on nor-
mal client-PMR interactions, views on programme activ-
ities, goals, perceived barriers and facilitating factors.
In-depth interviews were conducted with 8 community
volunteers, selected to support training and monitoring
programme activities, and referred to as co-trainers (1 in
Kisii, 4 in Kwale and 3 in Bungoma). Six main trainers
(1 in Kisii, 2 in Kwale and 3 in Bungoma), public health
officers-government officers with three year tertiary
training on environmental health, were then interviewed.
These interviews allowed an exploration of implementa-
tion experiences at the point of delivery. For clarification,
issues raised from both sets of interviews were followed
up during seven interviews with district level officers and
programme managers. The focus of the manager inter-
views was on the role of actors, views on programme
goals, implementation experiences and perceptions of
factors influencing that process.
Finally, TA kept a field diary of daily activities in each
district. Emerging issues and ideas were recorded, and
detailed notes kept of activities and informal conversa-
tions with key actors. This enhanced reflexivity [11],
supported transparency in the interpretations and for-
mation of judgement, and enabled triangulation with
other data during the analysis stage.
Ethical considerations
Data collection was planned around local community
timetables and took local events into consideration. The
research aim and processes were explained to all partici-
pants, and their informed consent obtained for partici-
pation, recording of interviews, and use of verbatim
quotes, where applicable. Ethical clearance was obtained
from the National Ethical Review Board (Kenya Medical
Research Institute (SSC no 1056).
Data analysis
Qualitative interviews were taped, transcribed, and
translated into English. Qualitative data were analysed
using Nvivo7 (QSR international). Analysis entailed
open coding and progressive categorisation of issues in
an iterative process that included debriefing sessions
with respondents and regular consultations with the
research team [12]. The data were further organised
along the policy analysis dimensions of context, content,
actors and processes, proposed by Walt and Gilson [13].
Within each of these broader categories, more specific
analyses were conducted using two additional frame-
works: the scaling up framework, derived from consid-
eration of experiences of public health innovations in
low and middle income settings [14]; and a framework
on factors influencing the diffusion of innovation, drawn
from a systematic review of evidence from high income
countries around the introduction of technology, pro-
ducts or other health care innovations [15].
These two frameworks identify five main areas of
influence over the successful uptake of an innovation, as
summarised in Table 1. The term “innovation” denotes
new practices or set of interventions directed to improve
quality of care through coordinated actions [14], and
can be conceptualised as having two distinct but interre-
lated aspects. The first aspect consists of the central ele-
ments of the innovation, referred to as the “hard core”;
and the second is the organisational structure and sys-
tem, including management required for implementa-
tion, referred to as the “soft periphery” of the innovation
[15]. The “resource team” are the individuals or organi-
sations that have been involved in the development and
testing of innovations and seek to promote its wider
use. “User organisation” refers to the recipient of the
intervention [14], which in this study is the district
health system and district level public sector managers.
Successful uptake of an innovation also depends on
scaling up and organizational strategies. For example, if
innovation implementation is led by a central govern-
ment authority, like the MoH, it may be constrained by
the rigid management processes of public bureaucracies
that do not allow flexibility or take account of local con-
text during implementation. An innovation is also less
likely to be adopted if the resource team is dominated by
experts and donors, in comparison to those where there
is more participation by the user organisation [14]. Alter-
natively, uptake may be affected by the pace at which an
innovation is implemented; and, gradual expansion
through adapting the innovation in response to local real-
ties is often important for success. Finally, responsiveness
to changes in context is key to success. For example, poli-
tical directives may include a “policy push” in the initial
stages of implementation, boosting chances of success by
making financial resources available for implementation
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[15]. Taking advantage of such policy windows may
enhance uptake, although long term sustainability may
be dependent on resources and sustaining the enthu-
siasm after the policy window is over [14].
Results
Using the concepts outlined above, the experience of the
three programmes around these two innovation aspects
are outlined below.
Hard core elements of the intervention
From the document review and interviews, five main
programme activities were identified across sites: train-
ing, demand creation, accreditation, motivating actors,
and monitoring and evaluation. For each programme,
the details of these activities are outlined in Table 2,
together with the implementing agencies and funders.
Although similar programmes were implemented across
sites, there were clear differences in specific activities,
such as monitoring and evaluation (none was underta-
ken in Kwale, in comparison to the wider activities of
the other two sites), as well as in training, and in
demand creation.
In terms of training, in Kwale and Kisii, the interven-
tion involved direct training of PMRs during participa-
tory, skills-based workshops. The training covered
information on malaria treatment and control; signs and
symptoms of malaria, including danger signs; communi-
cation skills; and referral practices. In contrast, the
Bungoma intervention did not have direct training of
PMRs. Instead, it was primarily as a social marketing
strategy, with one day’s training initially provided only
for wholesale outlet and pharmacy owners to mobilise
their support and enable them to engage with PMRs.
The training provided wholesale outlet and pharmacy
owners with information on the use of anti-malarial
medicines and on the job aids that they were then
intended to distribute to retailers in the periphery.
Based on early evaluation of its own passive dissemi-
nation strategy, the Bungoma programme developed a
new information education and communication (IEC)
aimed at demand creation activity, and called the Jirani
kwa Jirani (JKJ- a Kiswahili phrase meaning neighbour
to neighbour). This activity was based on a pyramid
information dissemination approach in which trainers
passed information and IEC materials to an initial group
of community members, who then passed the same
messages to five neighbours, who in turn trained five
more neighbours – with the process repeated until all
village members were covered. More active IEC dissemi-
nation strategies were also applied in Kisii district, com-
pared to a more passive approach in Kwale.
Closer examination of innovation attributes through
the lens of innovation theory (as summarised in Table
1) highlights, in particular, how in the Kisii programme,
modifying the intervention to the local context sup-
ported positive outcomes. Unlike in Kwale, the face to
face PMR training was planned around the community
timetable to take account of socio-economic and cul-
tural activities, such as farming and funerals, which
affected the number of workshop attendees or their
availability during follow up activities. These modifica-
tions resulted in timely supervision of PMRs, ensuring
that the knowledge gained during initial training was
sustained. In addition, and only in the Kisii programme,
record keeping by PMRs allowed them personally to
monitor trends in the cases they treated, and so enabled
them to make informed opinions on when to build
stock. As one retailer pointed out: “It enables you to
know a period when you need to stock more drugs from
the record that you have kept”.
Soft periphery
Attributes of the resource team and user organization
In each site, the intervention was implemented by a
combination of actors from outside and within the
Table 1 Categories of issues likely to contribute to successful implementation
Categories Relevant issues to consider
Attributes of innovation Room to modify the innovation to suit local needs
Ability of end users to see results of intervention
Attributes of the resource
team
Effective leaders that command authority and respect
Have understanding of the socio-economic environment of implementation.
Training capacity
Close physical proximity to the resource team
Attribute of the user
organization
Have appropriate technical capacity to implement it.
Stable and Effective leadership
Perceives need for the innovation
Linkages and networks both inside and outside the organization are more likely to ensure innovations become part
of the user system
Scaling up strategy Strategies that allow learning and managing local context
External Context Taking advantage of policy windows such as drug policy changes with adequate communication
Adapting to implementation environments (bureaucracy, socio- economic and cultural contexts).
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district health system (Table 3). Actors outside the dis-
trict health team essentially provided technical support
to the district health managers and are referred to here,
using the language of innovation theory, as the resource
team. The district health managers, meanwhile, are
referred to as the user organisation, and were responsi-
ble for implementation. In addition, in all sites, indivi-
duals drawn from both groups, and referred to as a core
team, acted as a bridge between the resource team and
the user organisation, and sought, in particular, to har-
ness support for the intervention from the user
organisation.
Again, examination of programme experiences and,
particularly, actors, through the lens of innovation the-
ory (Table 1), highlights several influences over pro-
gramme implementation and outcomes. First, the Kisii
experience illustrates how the attributes of the resource
team contributed to positive programme outcomes. In
this site, the resource team had a long experience in
supporting district activities, such as epidemic manage-
ment of malaria. The success of these programmes gen-
erated a positive image of the resource team among the
user organisation, enhancing Merlin’s credibility, a fea-
ture noted in innovation theory as necessary for success
Table 2 Key design features of programmes across sites
Characteristics Kwale-MoH Kisii-Merlin Bungoma-AMREF
Training PMRs and
their suppliers
Two-day participatory
training workshops of PMRs
to build their capacity
Three-day participatory training of PMRs to build
their capacity
Social marketing, training of Mobile vendors,
wholesale attendants, to disseminate job aids
and build their capacity
Creating demand
from consumers
for appropriate
drugs
Raising community
awareness through supply of
IEC materials to PMRs for
distribution
Raising community awareness through public
meetings, schools and churches and distribution
of T-shirts with messages on fever management
at community level
Raising community awareness through
pyramid process, using drama, songs and
community contacts
Accreditation of
trained outlets
Provision of paper posters to
enhance their credibility in
the eyes of consumers
Provisions of wooden posters and award of
certificates to enhance their credibility in the
eyes of consumers
Enhancing their credibility through signing
agreement forms, letters of approval and
providing copies of the official government
notice on recommended drugs
Motivation of
actors
Motivating actors participating in workshops through financial token. Per diem
allowances of $ 3.7 given to PMRs, and $ 5.2 for PHOs and DHMT members
participating in the workshops.
Financial token and recognition through
public meeting. $7.5 was given to mobile
vendors and PHOs and DHMT members and
recognition certificates to trainers and PMRs
who performed well in the intervention
during public meetings dubbed “Malaria
Effective Treatment Nights”.
Monitoring and
evaluation
None Record keeping, quizzes and operational
research supplemented with dialogue to solve
problems encountered and on site reminders to
promote sustainability of the new knowledge.
Through quizzes and operational research to
sustain knowledge gained and assess areas
for further improvement, receipts on
distributed IEC materials collected to assess
coverage.
Implementing
agencies/funding
MoH –Global Fund NGO-Merlin in collaboration with MoH with
funding from Government of Finland
AMREF, USAID, QAP through contractual
agreements between AMREF and CDC
Table 3 Program actors across the sites
Site Resource team User organisation Core team
Kisii Merlin project coordinator (overall
supervision); Programme managers, IEC
Officers, Monitoring and evaluation officers,
field team
District Public Health Officer (coordination,
logistical support, supervision and
awareness creation); District Medical Officer
(supervision); Divisional Public Health
Officers (facilitators and trainer)
Three Merlin officials and three PHOs from
the programme site
Kwale Government officers from the Division of
Malaria Control (DoMc), (strategic policy
direction and facilitating funding);
Researchers (technical support).
District Public Health Officer; District
Medical Officer; Divisional Public Health
Officers all with similar roles as described
above
District PHO
Bungoma USAID officials (designed and funded
programme); Centres for Diseases Control
(CDC) officials (part of initial team that
designed the intervention and conducted
operational research); AMREF officials
(technical support); IEC specialists (designed
and developed IEC materials).
District Public Health Officer; District
Medical Officer; Divisional Public Health
Officers with similar roles like Kisii
Five members from resource team and five
different district health departments
(nutrition, medical records, pharmacy, public
health, social work)
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(Table 1). Members of the resource team had experience
in strategic thinking and operational research around
the role of PMRs in malaria control. As one member
illustrated, ‘I have been involved in the shopkeeper train-
ing programme for a long time and some of the chal-
lenges I have already gone through them in other
settings. So it was quite easy for me to have a picture of
where the programme is going, the challenges you are
likely to encounter and how we have dealt with them in
other settings”. The resource team were also residents in
the district, enabling frequent contacts with the user
organisation and so building capacity through technical
support, as well as allowing the development of a rela-
tionship of trust.
In contrast, the resource team in Kwale was a partner-
ship between national stakeholders and researchers,
neither of whom had a physical base in the district. In
Bungoma, meanwhile, although the large resource team
harnessed considerable technical support for the inter-
vention, a feature that can facilitate innovation adoption
(Table 1), only some members of the resource team,
especially AMREF actors, were residents in the district.
Moreover, the high mobility of the international mem-
bers generated tensions and financial expectations, lead-
ing to interpersonal conflicts with the user organization
that affected the implementation process and outcome.
Second, despite deliberate efforts to build user organi-
sation capacity, a key challenge to implementation in
Bungoma and Kwale was the transfer of key actors out
of the districts, negatively affecting leadership stability
(Table 1). As a member of the Bungoma user organisa-
tion noted: “the challenges of implementation were
because most of the District Health Management Team
(DHMT) members who were there then were transferred,
apart from one. The new people who came in had no
idea about this, so adapting to that was a big issue;
there was no continuity after the changes”.
Third, only in the Kisii programme was there evidence
that the programme responded to the felt needs of the
user organisation, perhaps contributing to a supportive
user environment (Table 1). As noted by a member of
the user organisation: “In Kisii Central, this programme
took place in Kiamokama and Mosocho. These areas
were facing the greatest malaria problems according to
the International Centre for Insect physiology and Ecol-
ogy (ICIPE) research, which was directing Merlin to
areas where malaria was a big problem’.
Fourth, all the programmes were linked to networks of
actors. In innovations, such networks often provide
resources that facilitate implementation and contribute
to its sustainability [15]. In Kisii, formal networks at the
district level between Merlin, the District Health Man-
agement Team and ICIPE, as well as intermittent tem-
porary cooperation with other NGOs working in the
district, enabled resource sharing and access to wider
technical expertise. For example, ICIPE’s technical
expertise in vector control research allowed Merlin to
target the intervention geographically, as described
above, on the basis of evidence. At the community level,
moreover, Merlin linked with administrators, commu-
nities and retailers through sharing information and
establishing committees to mobilize communities and
strengthen grassroots support. Generally, these networks
in Kisii resulted in effective use of programme resources
and technical support, as well as strengthening PMRs
and community support.
In contrast, few efforts were made in Kwale to develop
partnerships with other organizations as the implemen-
tation strategy emphasised the user organisation’s role
in managing the programme locally as a way of
strengthening sustainability. In Bungoma, meanwhile,
there was a much more complex network with many
partners. At the national level, USAID developed lin-
kages with AMREF through a formalized, contractual
agreement. USAID also contracted the Quality Assur-
ance Project (QAP) and Centre for Diseases Control
(CDC) to provide technical expertise to the programme,
leading to an intervention with many external partners
working through the government system. However, the
strong research role of CDC generated negative percep-
tions of the programme among the user organization
because it was perceived to prioritise research over pro-
gramme implementation. The presence of well
resourced external partners in this instance contributed
to destabilizing relationships at the district and commu-
nity levels.
Finally, as Table 3 emphasises, the core teams were an
important feature of all these programmes. In innova-
tion theory terms, the core teams were intended to be
the programme champions, facilitating implementation
and strengthening linkages between the resource team
and the user organisation [15]. In Kisii, the core team
comprised experienced actors who were, as one noted,
able to support implementation: “You know different
communities have different attitudes and my longer stay
here has prepared me well to understand the type of peo-
ple I deal with so that when I go there, I know the type
of mechanism to put in place so that I can win them. So
I think that enabled me to achieve a lot”. In the other
sites, however, the constitution and composition of this
team generated tensions within the user organisation.
The selection of only one divisional PHO as the core
team in Kwale limited district wide support, whilst in
Bungoma the lack of involvement of divisional actors
caused problems. As a member of the user organisation
noted: “Actually because it is like they involved people at
the DHMT level. But the PHO were brought on board
later. And I think that is what they [implementing team]
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didn’t take nicely..... We didn’t do it wisely, the composi-
tion varied ...It is unfortunate that it is just the DHMT
that took over, and we didn’t realize that at the end of it
we will need other people who are the real stakeholders”.
Managing the implementation of the innovation
Whilst innovation theory highlights the influence of a
range of strategy issues on implementation success
(Table 1), programme experiences highlight, instead,
important management factors. These sets of issues are
considered together here in four categories: the scaling
up strategy, actor management, adapting to context, and
financial management.
The type of scaling up strategy
In Kisii and Kwale, the implementation process began in
selected geographical divisions, with the aim of covering
the entire district through the gradual expansion of
activities to other areas, illustrating a horizontal scaling
up approach [14]. This process enabled the careful
implementation of all elements of the intervention. The
gradual expansion of the intervention also allowed per-
sonal contact to develop with PMRs, enhancing the
communication and feedback process, and identifying
gaps in retailers’ knowledge which could be addressed.
However, as the main responsibility for implementation
fell on the user organisation in Kwale, other competing
district level activities sometimes disrupted the imple-
mentation process. For example, the national measles
campaign in 2005 interrupted divisional level actors
mobilisation of the programme, and resulted in limited
demand creation at community level.
In Bungoma district, meanwhile, implementation
occurred on a district-wide basis, and scaling up sought
to expand programme coverage by adding a new ele-
ment (community awareness through the JKJ strategy)
to the existing intervention. This is referred to as a
functional diversification or grafting scaling up strategy
[11]. This approach, however, faced the challenge of
how to sustain the new activities when external funding
came to an end. In addition, the withdrawal of funding
without consultation resulted in a disruption of the
activities among the user team and communities, under-
mining their support of the intervention.
Managing actors and wider context
The implementation experiences demonstrate that rela-
tionships between the actors involved in every pro-
gramme required deliberate management, and there was
clear evidence that failure to manage these relationships
affected implementation processes. For example, in
Kwale, unrelated tensions over financial accounting
among the user organisation members led to delays in
convening DHMT meetings. This delayed implementa-
tion as one condition of the funding was to convene a
DHMT meeting before any money was spent. On the
other hand, a good illustration of a deliberate actor
management strategy was noted in Kisii. Relationships
between the resource team and user organisation were
managed by a memorandum of understanding (MoU),
introduced in the initial stages of implementation by the
resource team. The MoU spelt out the roles of the
resource team and the user organisation, and how
resources would be shared. This MoU enabled construc-
tive participation in intervention planning by both
groups, resulting in successful implementation of most
intervention elements. These characteristics were absent
in the other sites.
In Kisii, programme implementation was driven by
action research, and this allowed the intervention to be
adapted to the local environment. Decision making was
also decentralized to the local Merlin offices, enabling
local initiative, mutual learning and problem solving.
Although action research was also used to guide imple-
mentation in Bungoma, adaption to local context was
minimal, largely due to coordination challenges between
the user organization members in relation to how the
data was used for planning. In Kwale, meanwhile, imple-
mentation was managed by the user organisation
through the much less flexible decision making pro-
cesses of the government bureaucracy.
The strength of management in the Kisii site was
demonstrated by the deliberate efforts made to contain
the impact on programme implementation of the
national level decision to move from sulphadoxine pyri-
mithamine (SP) to artemisinin based combination as the
first line drug for malaria treatment in 2004. Initial
information on drug policy changes was relayed through
formal government procedures; however, given a lack of
clarity on the drug of choice for the retail sector, Merlin
actively sought, through its own networks, further infor-
mation and official documentation on this issue. The
MoH then sent out a circular stating that PMRs could
be trained on amodiaquine as the over the counter med-
icine until a proper policy was developed, allowing the
resource team to revise all its IEC materials before the
policy change occurred.
In the other two sites, however, the drug policy
change had negative influences on programme imple-
mentation. In Kwale, inadequate communication
through official government channels led the DHMT to
perceive that central government did not actively sup-
port the involvement of PMRs in malaria control. The
slow response in communicating on the type of medi-
cine to be used for the retail sector also created con-
cerns over the continuity of the intervention among the
user team. This generated challenges such as inadequate
distribution of materials that had already been produced
with SP medicines. Revision and production of new IEC
materials referring to the new drug of choice could then
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not be undertaken because of budgetary constraints. In
Bungoma, meanwhile, although AMREF, like Merlin,
had national networks, it did little to secure clarification
on the drug of choice for the retail sector in time to
adapt its activities. Furthermore, as the JKJ strategy had
emphasised SP, the drug policy change eroded the confi-
dence of trainers and challenged the authenticity of
information passed to clients, affecting delivery of the
intervention.
Financial management and its influence on process and
outcome
The process of financial disbursement mirrored the
organisational arrangements of the organisations sup-
porting each programme. In Kisii, the resource team
was not only well funded but worked within an efficient
system of disbursing funds for implementation. The
flexible funding process facilitated changes in some hard
core elements of the innovation. For example, in
response to suggestions from PMRs on the need for
more time to understand the content of training, the
resource team prolonged the training period from two
to three days. This promoted understanding and con-
tributed to improved knowledge and PMRs practices
compared to the other sites.
In contrast, Kwale had a complex funding process, with
lengthy timelines, that was tied to the government finan-
cial management system and constrained implementation,
a feature that was particular to Kwale and not necessarily
associated with other MoH programmes. Moreover, the
failure to harmonise divisional level budgets with the dis-
trict work plans meant that the budgetary needs were not
fully met, or prevented funds from being used for local
adaptation. This led, in particular, to inadequate demand
creation, as illustrated here: “Mobilization was not exten-
sively done because according to the plan, there was only a
day or so for mobilizing the communities. Now you under-
stand that some of areas are extensive that you cannot
cover in a day or so many of the areas were not extensively
sensitised of the programme.”
Finally, in Bungoma, all funds were disbursed to
AMREF through a contractual agreement with USAID.
The resource team in Bungoma therefore had direct
control of programme funds, and this facilitated timely
implementation of activities, as well as allowing pro-
grammatic adaptations to local realities. However, as the
DHMT had no role in financial management this, com-
bined with financial expectations among programme
implementers, generated the perception of a lack of
transparency and wider tensions: “One of the biggest
challenges was financial resources because people were
not transparent. You see if we are partners and if you
want us to have active participation then it is also good
that people know what the inputs are. People did not
know what went into this program for the five years if
they knew then they read about it in the final reports.
I think people were in the dark. This made people suspi-
cious, and the credibility of the good project was
damaged so people always feel they were being cheated’
(member, user organisation).
Discussion
This study has firstly demonstrated the range of factors
that influence the scaling up of PMR programmes and
their successful implementation and, then, highlighted
key approaches that can support successful scaling up of
such programmes. The main limitation is that the study
was not set up to test propositions about the factors
explaining implementation problems and achievements
derived from these frameworks. Nonetheless, the use of
the frameworks in analysis helped guide systematic con-
sideration, both within and across sites, of the factors
that wider theory and empirical evidence suggest can
facilitate or hamper effective implementation of innova-
tive programmes. This process enabled reflection on
explanations for the observed variations across pro-
grammes in implementation experience, including the
primary outcome variable.
The factors shown to influence PMR implementation
are confirmed by wider experience. Many studies high-
light the important influence of actors over the success-
ful implementation of health programmes. For example,
in Kenya, the introduction of the Malarone® donation
programme showed the political and bargaining influ-
ence of national, regional or international actors over
the development and implementation of the programme.
International actors did not effectively involve national
bodies responsible for drug policies, and there were
many differences of opinion between regional bodies
and international actors over the relevance of donation
as a policy intervention. As a result, the programme was
characterised by conflicts in its early stages and was
only slowly implemented [16].
The influence of implementing actors, specifically, on
policy implementation, is well documented in studies
from various settings. Front line providers have been
shown, for example, to understand and implement poli-
cies differently from original intentions, often undermin-
ing effective implementation [17-19]. In addition,
experiences from other settings show how instability in
local health system leadership negatively influences policy
implementation. In Brazil, for example, leadership
changes following elections stalled the implementation of
family planning services and threatened the sustainability
of reproductive services [20]. Similarly, in Zambia, health
care reforms led providers to feel insecure in their jobs,
resulting in a high turnover of staff during the implemen-
tation of new reproductive services and undermining the
scaling up of contraceptive services [21].
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Wider evidence also highlights both the challenges of
managing through inflexible government bureaucracies,
and the importance of flexible management systems in
successful scaling up processes. Often, the centralised
bureaucratic procedures of government systems under-
mine local decision-making flexibility and so present
challenges to the implementation of innovative interven-
tions [14]. For example, in a study aimed at illuminating
the difficulties of implementing reproductive health pro-
grammes in Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and South Africa,
the authors illustrate how financial decision making
remained subject to centralised controls, even in the
context of a decentralised system in Ghana and Zambia.
This made the integrated management of resources
responding to local needs and priorities difficult [22].
Drawing on the study findings, Figure 1 summarises
the set of factors likely to facilitate the successful scaling
up of PMR training programmes. It shows that success-
fully introducing PMR interventions requires that atten-
tion be paid not just to the overarching programme
design but also to the features of the resource team,
user organisation and their relationships, which are also
important influences over effective programme imple-
mentation. These elements of the soft periphery of an
innovation [14] have been largely overlooked in plan-
ning PMR interventions.
Given the particular importance of actor management
and flexible implementation processes, three main con-
clusions can be derived from this study for future imple-
mentation of PMR training programmes. First, it is
important to appoint skilful leaders to drive scaling up
processes. A strong and experienced resource team that
has a good relationship with the user organisation is
likely to be trusted within the local setting, and supports
effective scaling-up. In addition, where this team has
links into wider networks, additional informational and
other resources can be drawn into supporting pro-
gramme implementation. This conclusion has implica-
tions for the types of people that might be important in
resource teams, and for the time that must be invested
in setting up the relationships supporting policy imple-
mentation. Continuity in the implementation of PMR
programmes is also dependent on the stability of district
leadership. Moreover, in all three districts examined
here, a core team (Figure 1) was established to lead
implementation. Establishing such a team is widely
recommended in the PMR strategic documents [23].
This experience shows that the core team worked better
when a consultative process, involving the user organisa-
tion and the resource team, was used in selecting its
members, and when these members had a good under-
standing of the management systems of both the
resource team and the district health system. Where
core team members are drawn from a range of organisa-
tions, it is also particularly important to clarify carefully
their roles and responsibilities to avoid confusion and
duplication of activities.
Second, the study illustrates the importance of building
and managing partnerships as part of intervention man-
agement, as recommended by World Health Organisa-
tion (WHO) guidelines for HMM programmes [24].
Experience from previous PMR interventions supports
the recommendation of involving public health officials
and community representatives in curriculum develop-
ment, training and supervision, as this is likely to contri-
bute to acceptability [6]. Recent documentation on PMR
Soft periphery 
Adequate management of actors through  
Memorandum of understanding to  
Reduce expectations  
Innovation
User organization  
Stable district leadership facilitate 
implementation process; Transparent and 
flexible management system creating a 
supportive user environment; Flexible 
funding process and accountability
Resource team   
Strong and established relationship with the 
user organisation to generate trust 
Experienced in the innovation  
Wider linkages to supportive networks
Core team
Consultative 
selection and 
clear
functioning 
of the core
team
Scaling up 
strategy which 
allows learning and 
adapt to local 
realities
Managing external context
Adapt to local contextual realities; Flexible response 
to changing features of context especially drug 
policy changes  
Retailers
Changes in retailer 
knowledge and 
adherence to knowledge 
gained 
Hard core 
elements of 
innovation 
Adapt innovation to 
local realities to 
facilitate uptake.  
Adequate public 
information 
activities to 
generate demand 
and support the 
sustainability of 
innovation.  
Adequate 
management 
of client-
retailer
interaction
Relatively high 
performance
Clients
Encourage clients to 
demand right 
medicines 
Figure 1 summary of key factors enabling successful implementation of PMR interventions
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programmes also suggests that to enhance the chances of
programme acceptability, the community entry process
should involve key figures from social, political, and reli-
gious groups, and should sustain the interactive nature of
consultation and negotiation with stakeholders [23].
While this study’s findings provide evidence of the value
of involving a wide spectrum of actors in planning and
development, it also highlights the challenges that result
from the involvement of many actors. Careful manage-
ment of these actors, for example, through effective com-
munication mechanisms, and particularly of the
relationship between the resource team and user organi-
sation, is likely to improve relationships between these
actors. Use of an MoU that provides a framework for
offering incentives to all actors involved, and clarifies the
roles of different partners in the implementation, as seen
in Kisii, is likely to be important.
Finally, the study provides ideas of how to address the
challenges imposed by various features of context. To
avoid the implementation gaps experienced in Kwale,
future implementation of PMR programmes may need
to find ways to allow greater authority in budgetary
decisions at a local level, even within existing govern-
ment procedures. Such authority brings the flexibility
necessary to allow the user organisation to experiment
with adapting different elements of PMR to local con-
texts, supporting positive outcomes (Figure 1). The pre-
sence of a resource team working to support PMR
implementation from outside government structures but
in close collaboration with the user organisation, as in
Kisii, may provide such flexibility in some settings.
However, this is less possible when funds for pro-
gramme implementation are channelled through govern-
ment systems to actors such as district health systems.
In such situations, it is important that there is sufficient
decentralisation of decision-making authority to the
local level, supporting flexible management action that
is responsive to local needs and circumstances. Such
flexibility may also allow responsiveness to broader pol-
icy changes which influence the programme, such as
changes in drug regimens. However, it is equally, if not
more, important that the implementation of any policy
change likely to impact on PMR programmes is thought
through carefully at a national level so as to limit nega-
tive impacts on local activities. In this study, the Kisii
case study illustrates positive outcomes with fewer chal-
lenges of implementation than in the other cases. This
seems likely to be associated with the particular man-
agement approach adopted in this site, and its flexibility.
Conclusions
Overall, the study shows that for effective scaling up of
PMR programmes, the provision of technical support
and adequate resources for successful adoption of the
PMR intervention by the user organization are vital, but
not sufficient on their own. Deliberate and careful man-
agement of the implementation process is key to suc-
cessful uptake and impact at retailer level. Three keys
aspects of management are critical for success. First, it
is important to develop an active strategy to manage
relationships between implementing actors through
effective communication mechanisms, and by early,
clear and transparent development of a set of principles
to guide relationships (as the MoU in the Kisii cases
study illustrated). Second, key actors responsible for
implementation must have adequate management train-
ing and support. Third, successful outcomes may be rea-
lised if a strong and transparent management system,
including management of financial resources, is put in
place. This study, finally, provides evidence of the value
of assessing implementation processes as part of impact
evaluation for public health programmes, and the role of
policy analysis approaches. Such assessment enhances
the interpretation of quantitative outcomes and provides
a basis for generating lessons about how to strengthen
future implementation.
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